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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the conduct of monetary policy in an environment in which cyclical 
swings in risk appetite affect households' propensity to save. It uses a New-Keynesian model 
featuring external habit formation to show that taking note of precautionary saving motives 
justifies  an  accommodative  policy  bias  in  the  face  of  persistent,  adverse  disturbances. 
Equally, policy should be more restrictive - i.e. `lean against the wind' - following positive 
shocks.  Since  the  size  of  these  `risk-adjustments'  is  increasing  in  the  degree  of 
macroeconomic volatility, ignoring this channel could lead to larger policy errors in turbulent 
times - with good luck translating into good policy. 
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1. Introduction
A lot of modern policy analysis is conducted using linear, or linearized, mod-
els. While these may be able to replicate salient features of macroeconomic
dynamics, there are important areas where their ability to `match data' is less
satisfactory. In particular, all such models ignore the impact of uncertainty on
the transmission mechanism of shocks. 1 Agents in these models do not require
compensation for holding risky assets nor do they save for precautionary reasons.
To the extent that risk premium is a signicant determinant of asset price data
and precautionary savings are a clear feature of macro data, using models so
badly misspecied along these dimensions could result in systematically biased
policy recommendations. In what follows we investigate this issue in more depth.
The impact of nonlinearities and risk on economic dynamics has recently
been the subject of considerable attention (e.g. Rubio-Ramirez and Fernndez-
Villaverde (2005); Andreasen (2008); Rudebusch and Swanson (2008); Hordahl,
Tristani, and Vestin (2008); Ravenna and Seppala (2006)). Rather than try-
ing to analyze many aspects of uncertainty, we start by focusing on just one {
precautionary savings.2 The importance of precautionary motives has long been
recognized with some estimates suggesting that they account for 40% of all wealth
1All linear models are `certainty-equivalent' and coecients of their policy functions are
independent of uncertainty (shock volatility).
2There has been some ambiguity as to what exactly precautionary savings are { see also
2accumulation.3 Moreover, since we are interested in monetary policy implications
of uncertainty, incorporating a channel which directly aects equilibrium interest
rates seems fundamental. Finally, focusing on a single aspect of risk makes it
easier to establish traction with standard models used for policy analysis and
allows us to derive our results analytically.
We believe that a models' ability to match the dynamics of risk-premia is
a good diagnostic of whether it accounts for risk correctly. Since the bench-
mark macro model fails to do so, we extend it by introducing persistent external
habits { whose appeal in the asset-pricing context was demonstrated by Camp-
bell and Cochrane (1999). In our framework, external habits generate cyclical
swings in risk aversion, which translate into uctuations in the desire to save for
precautionary reasons. Crucially, to make this channel relevant, we consider a
non-linear approximation to the consumption-Euler equation { explicitly allowing
for a state-dependent precautionary-saving motive.
Our rst contribution is to characterize factors determining the cyclical prop-
erties of precautionary savings. We show that these factors match those driving
the dynamics of risk premia. Accordingly, a model in which risk premia vary
in line with the data is likely to generate countercyclical precautionary saving
motives. We also nd that a countercyclical coecient of risk aversion, which is
a standard feature of all habit models, might not be sucient to generate such
dynamics. What is necessary is that the persistence of shocks and habits is suf-
ciently high { i.e. agents must expect a fall in living conditions to persist in
Floden (2008). Our usage of the term is closest to that in Kimball (1990) and implies that,
absent uncertainty, there would be no precautionary savings. Our model assumes complete
nancial markets and precautionary savings do not arise from borrowing or liquidity constraints
as in Deaton (1991) or Huggett and Ospina (2001).
3See also Carroll and Samwick (1998). Other papers highlighting the importance of pre-
cautionary savings include Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970), Carroll (1992), Kazarosian (1997) or
Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001).
3order for higher risk aversion to translate into a greater desire to save.4
We then analyze policy implications of such swings in precautionary saving
motives. We derive expressions for the `natural' rate of interest { i.e. the one that
would prevail if prices were fully exible { both in a linear, `certainty-equivalent'
setup and in a world in which agents save for precautionary reasons. In doing so,
we characterize monetary policy consistent with price stability in both setups.5
We nd that properly accounting for swings in risk appetite and the desire
to save reduces the appropriate monetary policy response to productivity shocks.
Following a positive productivity shock central bankers striving to maintain price
stability cut rates to boost demand and prevent falls in the price level. However,
since a persistent positive productivity shock also reduces agents' desire to save
for precautionary reasons, the cut in rates required to boost demand is smaller
{ i.e. the intertemporal substitution eect is partially oset by swings in the
precautionary motive. Conversely, given that a positive demand shock merits
interest rate hikes { and since associated falls in precautionary motives exacerbate
the increases in demand { policy needs to respond more strongly once changes
in precautionary savings are accounted for. Overall, the precautionary channel
introduces a contractionary bias during booms, and an accommodative slant
during downturns.
Our analytical expressions show that the size of the 'precautionary correction'
is increasing in the degree of shock volatility. The implication is that ignoring
the impact of swings in risk appetite and precautionary behavior would tend to
4These conditions closely mirror those for risk premium countercyclicality derived in De Paoli
and Zabczyk (2008). As a result, and as discussed in that paper, our model is likely to exhibit
desirable asset pricing properties.
5Amato and Laubach (2004) nd that price stability is not fully optimal in the presence of
habits. However, such a policy is not quantitatively far from the social optimum { see also
footnote 13. For this reason, and to obtain analytical results, we focus on such a policy.
4lead to larger systematic policy mistakes in highly turbulent times, when shock
volatility is large. In our model, a period of good luck { i.e. low macroeconomic
volatility { translates into good policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we
present the model. We also characterize the linearized system of equilibrium
conditions and the corresponding natural rate of interest. In Section 3, we in-
corporate the precautionary savings channel and analyze its implications for the
natural rate of interest and thus monetary policy. We then use simulations to
illustrate our results and inspect their robustness before summarizing and high-
lighting possible extensions.
2. Model
Our model economy is inhabited by a continuum of consumer-producers living
on the unit interval (and indexed by j 2 [0;1]). Agents are assumed to maximize


























t denotes agent j's consumption, Xt is the level of habits and d;t is a
preference shock. The second term in the large bracket captures the disutility of
producing yt(j) units of the dierentiated output good given productivity denoted
by y;t.6
6Given the Calvo price setting specication that we subsequently adopt, households' produc-
tion income could be dierent depending on the type of good produced. In the remainder, as in
Woodford (2003), we assume that there exist competitive nancial markets in which these risks
are eciently shared.
5We dene the coecient of relative risk aversion as7












and Uy(;) denotes the partial derivative of utility function U(;) with respect to
y. Since this coecient measures agents' willingness to enter pure consumption
gambles, given habits equal to Xt, it can be referred to as consumption risk aver-
sion. It is easy to show that #(Ct;Xt) is countercyclical, when { as in Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) { St is used as a measure of cyclical stance.
We assume that habits Xt are `external' - i.e. individual agents treat them
as exogenous. We adopt a slow-moving habit specication under which
xt = (1   )ct 1 + xt 1 (4)
where  controls the persistence of the habit process and small letters denote
log-deviations from steady state. We further assume that both preference and
productivity shocks are autoregressive processes given by
"d;t+1 =dem"d;t + d;t+1 "y;t+1 =prod"y;t + y;t+1
with "x;t  log(x;t) and the disturbances x;t+1 being mean zero, uncorrelated
i:i:d: random variables with variance given by 2
x; x 2 fd;yg.
















7As noted in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) 'risk aversion may also be measured by
the normalized curvature of the value function [...] or by the volatility of the stochastic discount
factor [...] While these measures of risk aversion are dierent from each other in this model,
they all move inversely with St.'
6where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the dierentiated varieties.
Conditional on the specication above, we can characterize agents' intratemporal















Alternatively, we could rewrite the consumption Euler equation as
1 = RtEtMt+1 (7)
where the stochastic discount factor Mt+1 is dened as
Mt+1  
d;t+1(Ct+1   hXt+1) 
d;t (Ct   hXt)
  : (8)
Prices are assumed to follow a partial adjustment rule  a la Calvo (1983). Pro-
ducers of dierentiated goods know the form of their individual demand functions,
given by (5), and maximize prots taking aggregate demand Yt and the price level
Pt as given. In each period, a fraction  2 [0;1) of randomly chosen producers is
not allowed to change the nominal price of their output. The remaining fraction
of rms, given by (1   ); chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected
discounted value of prots. The optimal choice of producer j allowed to reset his















where yt;T(j) is producer j's time t estimate of demand for his good at time T,
should he be unable to reset his price e pt(j) before period T. It can be proved
that equation (9) implies that the price index evolves according to
(Pt)1  = P1 
t 1 + (1   )(e pt)
1  (10)
7where we exploit the fact that all producers who reset prices at time t equate
them to e pt.
Finally, we close the model with a monetary policy rule. In fact, most of
the analysis to follow assumes that the central bank follows a targeting rule
that ensures price stability { i.e it sets t  log(Pt+1=Pt) = 0 for every t as to
replicate the exible price allocation. But such a target could be implemented
using an instrumental rule (e.g. Gali (2008), Chapter 4). This allows us to draw
conclusions for a central bank that uses interest rates to achieve price stability
(arguably, a more realistic representation of how monetary policy is conducted).8
In the nal section of the paper we explicitly consider the case in which the
monetary authority follows a Taylor-type rule.
The system is closed by the market clearing condition Ct = Yt. To keep
the model parsimonious and allow for analytical representation of the results
our framework abstracts from capital, there is no storage technology, and agents
are homogenous { as in the canonical New Keynesian model. Eectively, this
means that in equilibrium there are no savings. Nevertheless, agents willingness
to save does aect dynamics and is reected in the Euler equation. We can now
summarize the log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions as
8
> > > <
> > > :
rt = Et((1   h)
 1 (yt+1   hxt+1)   "d;t+1)
t = k

0 (1   h)
 1 yt   (1   h)
 1 hxt   "y;t   "d;t

+ Ett+1
xt = (1   )yt 1 + xt 1:
where k = (1   )(1   )=((1 + )).
From the system above we can derive the equilibrium interest rate consistent
8The reason why we choose to solve the model using targeting rules rather than instrumental
rules is that in this case the order of approximation of the Euler equation is irrelevant for the
dynamics of other variables.
8with price stability in a linear world
r
t = 1Et("y;t+1   (1   h)"d;t+1   hx
t+1) (11)
where x is the exible-price level of habits and where
0 =(1   h) +  and 1 =  1
0 :
Expression (11) shows that the interest rate consistent with full price stability
falls [rises] following a positive supply [demand] shock { with the magnitude of
the response, on impact, given by 1 [(1   h)1].
3. Cyclical Risk Aversion and Precautionary Saving
We now consider the minimum departure from a linear model in which we can
analyze the impact of cyclical swings in risk aversion and precautionary saving
motives on economic dynamics. As a rst step, we retain the linear specication
of equilibrium conditions other than the Euler equation (7) { an approach that is
similar to the one commonly used in the macro-nance literature.9 This allows us
to single out the eect of precautionary savings in the model's dynamics. Also,
under this assumption we can obtain analytical solutions for the determinants
of precautionary behaviour. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we relax this
assumption later in the paper and assess the implications of having a non-linear
approximation to the entire model.
So to capture the precautionary savings motive we exploit the fact that under
9Many macro-nance papers consider a linearized macro model while Euler equations for asset
prices, such as the risk-free rate, are determined recursively and approximated non-linearly (see,
for example, Jermann (1998)).











where mt+1  log(Mt+1=  M) and the upper bar denotes steady state values. So,
although in our framework there are no actual savings, the interest rate that clears
the bond market is aected by agents' willingness to save both for precautionary
and intertemporal smoothing reasons.
While linear models capture the intertemporal substitution eect, they ignore
the term vart(mt+1). This term summarizes how uncertainty aects interest rates
through changes in agents' willingness to amass precautionary savings. Accord-
ingly, to analyze how the precautionary savings channel aects the transmission
mechanism of shocks, we need to understand the determinants of vart(mt+1). In
particular, we would like to evaluate how such precautionary motives change over
the cycle. Dening





vart(mt+1) = vart(~ mt+1) + covt(~ mt+1;"d;t+1) + 2
d: (14)
As shown in the Appendix, the covariance term in Equation (14) is necessarily
countercyclical. And given that shocks are homoskedastic (i.e. 2
d is constant),
the cyclical properties of vart(mt+1) depend solely on vart(~ mt+1). Accordingly,
we approximate this term to third order, the lowest which allows for time variation
10This equation holds up to second order without any distributional assumptions on the
stochastic discount factor.
10in vart(~ mt+1)11
vart(~ mt+1) = 2
1( 22
d + 2
y)(1   y"y;t   d"d;t + xxt) (15)
where
y=d =









Equation (15) highlights three channels through which uncertainty aects in-
vestors' behavior: the overall level of macroeconomic volatility - given by 2
y and
2
d; investors' risk aversion - given by  which in turn determines 1; current and
past economic conditions - as summarized by the state variable xt and shocks
"y;t, and "d;t.
Equation (15) demonstrates that as long as investors are risk averse uncer-
tainty aects their consumption decisions ( > 0 ) 1 > 0). It also illustrates
that without habit formation (h = 0) the strength of the precautionary saving
motive would not vary over the cycle (y = d = x = 0 ) vart(~ mt+1) is
constant).12 Furthermore, inspecting expression (16) reveals that
prod +  > 1 ) y > 0 and dem +  > 1 ) d > 0 (18)
which means that if shocks aecting economic activity are suciently persistent
and habits adjust slowly, then vart(~ mt+1) changes countercyclically. Accord-
ingly, investors will increase their willingness to engage in precautionary saving
11Note that rather than take the full third order approximation to the Euler equation here
we only approximate the variance term. This restriction { which permits us to single out the
precautionary savings eect and allows us to derive tractable analytical results { is relaxed in
our numerical exercises.
12Section A.1 in the Appendix shows that, in this case, not only is vart(~ mt+1) constant, but
vart(mt+1) is also time invariant.
11following bad shocks if they expect future economic conditions to remain poor
(consumption to remain persistently close to the habit level).
If, on the other hand, the expectation is for an improvement in economic
prospects, then negative shocks might not translate into higher precautionary
savings { even if the coecient of risk aversion given by (2) increases. This is
because if habits are fast moving and consumption recovers quickly, investors
faced with the bad shock will rapidly get used to lower levels of consumption
while at the same time, the latter quickly recovers. This means that investors
actually expect consumption to be far above its habit level in the future and
therefore might be less inclined to engage in precautionary savings. As discussed
in De Paoli and Zabczyk (2008), similar conditions are necessary to ensure that
risk premia are countercyclical.
4. Precautionary Saving and Monetary Policy
The implications of precautionary saving for interest rates will, therefore,
depend on the structural characteristics of the economy. Absent consumption
habits, with time invariant risk aversion, the presence of uncertainty will aect
the average level of the natural interest rate, but not its dynamics. In this case,
the response of the natural interest rate to shocks would not be aected by
buer-stock saving motives. In the general case, however, changes in perceived
uncertainty (captured by changes in vart(mt+1)) would generate uctuations in
the equilibrium interest rate - with ramications for the conduct of monetary
policy.
Amato and Laubach (2004) show that in a New Keynesian model with ex-
ternal habits, similar to ours, `despite the fact that stabilization is not complete
12V [] [the optimal volatility of ination] is quite low'.13 So in what follows, we
consider the case in which the central bank's goal is to maintain price stabil-
ity. Crucially, if the monetary authority uses interest rates as an instrument to
achieve this goal, then knowing the behavior of the natural rate of interest would
be key { as policy rates that ensure price stability track this rate. But how does
precautionary behavior aect the natural rate and, thus, the appropriate policy
response to shocks?
Equation (11) implies that the magnitude of responses of the natural rate to a
productivity shock in a `linear' world is given by 1. When accounting for uncer-
tainty, the size of these responses also depends on the cyclicality of precautionary
savings. If shocks and habits are persistent, and thus precautionary behavior is
countercyclical, then the response to shocks is dampened. That is, the precau-
tionary savings eect (captured by y > 0 in Equation (15)) counterbalances the
intertemporal substitution eect (captured in Equation (11)). A negative produc-
tivity shock increases the perceived riskiness of the economic environment, which
raises investors' willingness to save and puts downward pressure on interest rates.
As a result, the equilibrium interest rate that is consistent with stable prices will
be lower than in a linear economy. These results thus suggest that interest rates
should respond less to productivity shocks when precautionary savings are taken
into account. A similar conclusion would be reached if we were considering other
types of supply shocks { such as markup shocks.14
Note that our analysis evaluates the implications of allowing for higher order
approximations (as to capture the precautionary savings eect) in a model with
habits. This is dierent than the analysis of Amato and Laubach (2004) who
13In Amato and Laubach (2004), Table 1, nal column { which considers the calibration
closest to ours { the optimal volatility of ination is less that 0.2%.
14Markup shocks would enter the system of equilibrium conditions in a similar way to pro-
ductivity shocks, except with a dierent sign.
13assess the dierences in the dynamics of interest rates in a linear model with and
without habits. Their ndings suggest that habits increase the size of interest
rates uctuations because it increases the intertemporal substitution eect. This
is also found in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Our analysis, on the other
hand, focuses on the fact that, in a model with habits, allowing time-varying risk
aversion to aect agents willingness to save reduces the response of the natural
rate to productivity shocks.
We now consider the case of preference shocks. Condition (18) shows that
when uncertainty is introduced in a model that features persistent shocks and
habits, negative preference shocks also lead to higher precautionary savings. But
in this case incorporating uncertainty magnies the impact of the shock. That is,
the precautionary savings eect (captured by d > 0 in Equation (15)) reinforces
the intertemporal substitution eect (captured in Equation (11)). Accordingly,
in such settings, policymakers striving for price stability should respond more
aggressively to demand shocks.
Higher precautionary savings can be thought of as introducing an extra nega-
tive demand shock - both following negative productivity and preference shocks.
Since productivity and demand shocks call for opposite interest rate reactions
(when policymakers' aim is to maintain price stability) these results suggest that
depending on the source of the shock, policy that ignores precautionary savings
will either undershoot or overshoot its' appropriate level. But the general pre-
scription is that following expansionary shocks (i.e. a positive demand or supply
shock) monetary policy should be more restrictive than in a certainty equivalent
world, while when the shocks are contractionary monetary policy should be more
accommodative.
145. Quantitative analysis
The analysis developed so far oered an analytical representation of the mon-
etary policy transmission mechanism. However, a numerical illustration of dier-
ences in policy responses is of independent interest since it sheds some light on
the quantitative relevance of our results. The numerical simulations also allow
us to assess the implications of relaxing the assumption of linearity in the supply
condition.
5.1. Some numerical simulations
For our calibration we dene one period as a quarter and set  = 0:99 to yield
a 4% annualized steady-state real interest rate. As in Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) the parameter  is equal to 2.37 and the degree of habit persistence  is
set to 0.97. Following Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) we assume a value of
6 for the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply  and set  = 0:66 to obtain
an average length of price contracts of 3 quarters. The elasticity of substitution
between dierentiated goods  is assumed to take the value of 10 in line with
Benigno and Woodford (2005). Similar to Juillard, Karam, Laxton, and Pesenti
(2006) and Banerjee and Batini (2003) we calibrate the habit size parameter to
h = 0:85. As in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), the persistence of productivity
and preference shocks is set to 0:997 and 0:9 respectively, and the variance of
productivity shocks is 3.5 times higher than that of preference shocks. Finally,
we calibrate the overall level of shock volatility to match the standard deviation
of consumption growth of 0:75% (consistent with ocial UK Oce for National
Statistics quarterly data for consumption of non-durables and services from 1976
Q1 to 2007 Q3). The values of all parameters are summarized in Table 1.15
15Some of the values used in our calibration are based on micro-data while others come
from linear, general equilibrium models. Arguably, the fact that we allow for non-linearity
15Noticeably, our benchmark calibration follows closely the ones chosen in mod-
els that try to match risk premium dynamics. We believe that a model that
correctly captures agents' attitude towards risk and uncertainty should repro-
duce basic risk premia observations. So, following the insights of Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) and De Paoli and Zabczyk (2008), we assume a high level for the
habit parameter and a very slow-moving process for the habits. We also assess
the implications of considering dierent parameter values.
We begin the quantitative part of our investigation by comparing the level of
the natural rate of interest in a linear world with the one that would prevail if
the precautionary savings channel was additionally taken into account. First, in
line with the theoretical part, we consistently maintain a linearized version of the
Phillips curve while alternating between rst and third order approximations to
the Euler equation to switch the precautionary channel o and on respectively.16
Figure 1 illustrates the response of the natural rate of interest to a one stan-
dard deviation productivity shock in a linear model (black line) and in a model
that allows for a third order approximation of the Euler Equation and so in-
corporates precautionary savings (grey line). The chart shows that the fall in
the natural rate is smaller once the precautionary saving motive is incorporated.
More specically, once the decreased desire to save is taken into account, the mag-
nitude of the change in interest rates that would be required to boost demand
suciently to prevent falls in prices is more than halved (from approximately
could justify amending some of these parameters. For example, while a  of 0.99 implies a
deterministic-steady state value of the interest rate equal to 4%, the stochastic mean would be
below that. For this reason we veried that our results continue to fold for lower values of beta
{ including  of 0.982, which yields an ergodic mean of the interest rate equal to four percent.
A sensitivity analysis for other parameters is presented below.
16In particular, we compute a third order approximation of the Euler equation using pertur-
bation methods as implemented in Dynare++ and Perturbation AIM. As mentioned previously,
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Figure 1: Natural rate of interest following a one standard deviation positive productivity shock
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of results to changes in habit persistence 
1845bp annualized to less than 15bp on impact) under our benchmark calibration.
Figures 3 { 4 also illustrate that the dierences in the responses are smaller when
we reduce the habit parameter (h), the volatility of the productivity shock (2
y)
or the habit persistence parameter ().
Figure 1 compares the natural rate under two dierent orders of approxima-
tion to the Euler equation. When going beyond the linear approximation, the
solution incorporates the pure eect of uncertainty but also corrections coming
from non-linearities, which are unrelated to risk. Our argument above hinges on
the assumption that the reported dierences in impulse responses reect uncer-
tainty. To verify whether this is the case, Figure 5 considers two solutions. One
maintains the assumption that the Euler equation is approximated to third order,
while the other eliminates the eect of uncertainty in this approximation. So, the
black line would be equivalent to simulations from a perfect foresight model in
which the Euler equation is approximated to third order.17 The similarity of the
black line in Figures 1 and 5 conrms that the results reported above are indeed
driven by uncertainty or, more specically, precautionary behavior.
So, in line with the analytical results, the simulations suggest that a cen-
tral bank following an interest rate rule should be less aggressive in the face of
productivity shocks. If one believes that the benchmark calibration correctly cap-
tures how uncertainty aect economic dynamics, our exercise would additionally
suggest that the eects of precautionary savings can be quantitatively relevant.
Figure 6 demonstrates numerically that the response of the natural rate to a
negative preference shock is magnied when the precautionary savings channel
is taken into account. Agents' increased desire to save exacerbates the initial
shock and calls for more accommodative policy { i.e. bigger cuts in rates. But
17More formally the black line is generated by a policy function from which the 2nd order 
correction as well as the 3rd order x terms have been deleted. See also Schmitt-Grohe and
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Figure 5: Natural rate of interest following a one standard deviation positive productivity shock
(annualized, in percentage points): full third order approximation vs third order approximation
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Figure 6: Natural rate of interest following a one standard deviation negative preference shock
(annualized, in percentage points)
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of results to adopting a fully non-linear specication
the quantitative impact of the precautionary saving eect on the natural rate is
smaller than in the case of productivity shocks. This is a reection of the lower
persistence of such shocks relative to productivity shocks.
5.2. Allowing for a fully nonlinear approximation of the model
Until now we had focused on the precautionary savings channel through which
uncertainty aects the behavior of interest rates. Nevertheless, other channels
are present if we consider a fully non-linear approximation of our model. So far
we have considered a linear labor-leisure decision,18 but if we compare a rst and
third order approximation of this condition (see section A.2 in the Appendix) we
can see that excess consumption { i.e. consumption relative to the habit level {
reacts by more to changes in consumption when third order moments are incor-
porated. This implies that agents' marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
18Given that we assume that the central bank targets price stability, the labor-leisure decision
is the relevant condition to be approximated to higher order.
21is also more sensitive to changes in consumption. As a result, agents' desire to
smooth consumption will be larger at third order. So non-linearities in the labor-
leisure decision (more specically, non-linearities in excess consumption) increase
the intertemporal substitution eect.
Figure 7 illustrates this result for the case of a positive productivity shock {
with the dashed line representing the case in which the entire model is approx-
imated to third order. As we can see, the natural rate in this model reacts by
more than in the case in which only the Euler Equation is approximated to higher
order. Nevertheless, the response of interest rates under a third order approxi-
mation of the entire model is still smaller than in the fully linear model. That is,
the stronger intertemporal substitution eect partially osets the precautionary
savings eects that come about once we allow for non-linearities. But our result
that overall precautionary savings dampen the response of the natural rate to
productivity shock remains.
5.3. Assessing the performance of a misspecied Taylor rule
We now investigate policy errors which a central bank would make if it in-
correctly ignored changes in the strength of agents' precautionary savings motive
when setting interest rates. More specically, we assume that the central bank
follows a Taylor rule given by
rn
t = r
t + t + (yt   y
t) (19)
where rn
t is the nominal interest rate, y
t is the exible price allocation of output,
and r
t is the natural rate of interest dened in Equation (11) { i.e. one consistent
with price stability in a `linear', risk-free world.
Table 2 shows the implications of this policy for ination and the output
gap.19 We see that whereas the Taylor rule given by Equation (19) ensures zero
19Note that in this exercise we use a nominal version of the Euler equation, given that the
22ination and output gap volatility in a linear world, where the natural rate is
driven purely by the `intertemporal-substitution' channel, this is no longer the
case when uncertainty inuences agents' behavior. More specically, in that case,
the wrong policy increases the standard deviation of the output gap and ination
by 0.4pp.
While our numerical results suggest that implications of `policy mistakes'
are not large, this is partially driven by consumption in our model being very
insensitive to changes in the interest rate. If we were to reduce the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution and consider the case of log utility, this sensitivity
would increase and with it the standard deviation of the output gap and ination.
Furthermore, in our calibration the Phillips curve is quite at, so even if the
Taylor rule does not fully stabilize the output gap, this does not translate into a
volatile ination rate (see fth column of Table 2) { i.e. under a slightly changed
calibration these policy errors could become larger.
The concluding observation is that decreasing the level of uncertainty would
also lower the size of the ination and output gap volatility. That is, lower
uncertainty would decrease the size of policy mistakes. Thus, in these settings if
central banks have good luck (i.e. they confront a stable economic environment),
this will also translate into good policy (i.e. low policy mistakes). This result,
which is consistent with Figure 3, is illustrated in column 6 of Table 2.
6. Conclusion
Our results show that, following persistent, adverse shocks policy-makers
might be well advised to aim o predictions of linear models and conduct more
accommodative policy { particularly in highly turbulent periods. Equally, when
demand and supply conditions are improving, taking note of the precautionary
central bank is assumed to control the level of the nominal interest rate.
23saving motives justies `leaning against the wind'. Since the size of the precau-
tionary correction is increasing in the degree of volatility, mistakenly ignoring
this channel would be most costly during highly turbulent periods.
In order to obtain intuitive results and single out the precautionary savings
channel, our analysis proceeded in a stylized model. An investigation of the
impact of other risk channels in a fully edged DSGE model might also be of
interest. Moreover, formally accounting for stochastic volatility in a model with
investment (in light of the analysis in Bloom (2009)) and enriching the framework
by considering Epstein-Zin preferences (as in Bansal and Yaron (2004)) would
both make for interesting extensions.20
20Epstein-Zin preferences would be of particular interest since, with this specication it is
possible to calibrate separately the precautionary and the intertemporal smoothing motives for
savings.
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26APPENDIX - DERIVATIONS & TABLES
The logarithm of the stochastic discount factor is given by








































e mt+1 =  
 
ct+1   ct + st+1   st

:
It thus follows that
vart e mt+1 = Et (e mt+1   Et e mt+1)
2 = 2Et





vartct+1 + 2covt(ct+1;st+1) + varts+1

(21)
as the conditional expectations of all t-dated variables can be eliminated.
Up to a second order approximation (which is all we need to compute a third-














where we used the fact that the habit at time t + 1 depends only on variables
known at time t and so we changed the notation of xt+1 to e xt. We also dened
	1 := h=(1   h):
We can now compute a third order approximation to the vartst+1 and to that of
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+ e xt(1   h) 1vartct+1

: (24)
Consider the case in which shocks follow an AR(1) process, i.e.
"y;t+1 =prod"y;t + y;t+1 "d;t+1 =dem"d;t + d;t+1:
where "y and "d are independent (cross-sectionally and inter-temporally). As




ct = yt =
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(1   h) 1 + 
 1 


























(1   h) 1 + 

and where covt(d;t+1;y;t+1) = 0.









	1 e xt + d;t+1 + dem"d;t + y;t+1 + prod"y;t
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where 	3 := 	1	 1
2 = h=
 
 + (1   h)

. Similarly, plugging (26) and (27) into


























We can then use equations (26), (28) and (29) in (21) to obtain
















( + (1   h))

:
Given that e xt = xt+1 and so, e xt = ct(1   ) + xt we get










( + (1   h))
"d;t  
2hprod
( + (1   h))
"y;t
+
2h( + )(1   )
( + (1   h))
ct +
2h( + )




Recalling the denition of ct - equation (25)
ct =
 
(1   h) 1 + 
 1 
(1   h) 1hxt + "d;t + "y;t

(30)
29and plugging it into the expression derived above yields, after simplifying
vart e mt+1 =

1  
2h((1   h)( + )(   1) + ( + (1   h))dem)
( + (1   h))2 "d;t
 
2h((1   h)( + )(   1) + ( + (1   h))prod)
( + (1   h))2 "y;t
+
2h( + )((1   h) + (1   h(   1)))








( + (1   h))2:
which is the expression reported in the body of the text.
A.1. The covariance term covt(e mt+1;"d;t+1)
In line with the reasoning of the previous section, we can write
covt(e mt+1;"d;t+1) =  
2
d
( + (1   h))

1 +
h(1   h)( + )(1   )
( + (1   h))2  "d;t
+
h(1   h)( + )(1   )
( + (1   h))2 "y;t +
h( + )
 
( + ) + h(2(1   )   )

( + (1   h))2 xt

:
Note that the coecients on "y;t and "d;t are negative, so the covariance term
always moves countercyclically. The coecient multiplying xt is negative when
2(1   ) > ; but given that xt is predetermined, this would not aect the
countercyclicality of the covariance term.
A.2. A third order approximation of the Labour-Leisure decision
Under exible prices, or if the central bank successfully stabilizes ination, Equa-
tion (9) can be written as






or, given that YT = CT and dening Ce















+  logCT    log(y;T): (33)
30Given the steady state condition for CT and Ce





=  log(Ct=  C)   "y;t (34)
or
"d;t   ce
t = ct   "y;t: (35)
In order to obtain a third order approximation of the labour leisure decision in
terms of consumption, we need to expand excess consumption ce
t to third order.
It follows that
ce





3(1   h)2   ctxt
2h
3(1   h)2 + x2
t
h2







which can further be simplied to
ce





(ct   hxt) +
1
3(1   h)2(ct   hxt)2

:
So, the labour leisure decision can be written as









= "y;t + "d;t: (36)
31Table 1: Parameter values used in the quantitative analysis
Parameter Value Notes:
 0:99 To yield a 4% steady-state real interest rate
 6 As in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007)
 2:37 Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
 0:66 Length of average price contract 3 quarters
 10 Following Benigno and Woodford (2005)
h 0:85 Juillard, Karam, Laxton, and Pesenti (2006)
and Banerjee and Batini (2003)
 0:97 Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
dem 0:9 Following Smets and Wouters (2003)
prod 0:997 Following Smets and Wouters (2007)
2
y=2
d 3:5 Following Smets and Wouters (2003)
c 0:75% UK ONS data from 1976 Q1 to 2007 Q3
Table 2: Policy exercise (Values annualized and in percentage points)
Moment Linear Incorporating precationary saving
model Benchmark  = 1 & = 0:1 &c= 1:5%
 0 0:40 0:56 0:80 0:80
ygap 0 0:40 0:96 0:40 1:60
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